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Suppression of Illegally Obtained Evidence:
The Standing Requirement on its Last Leg*
by DANIEL G. GROVE**
Introduction
Recent concern with the impact of police action on individual liberties has
prompted re-evaluations of policy and implementation of new rules of law
in areas touching on police conduct. One of the developments has been a
slow and somewhat erratic mitigation of the standing requirement for sup-
pression of illegally obtained evidence. In what circumstances will a court
entertain a defendant's motion to suppress evidence on the basis that it was
obtained by a search or seizure violating the fourth amendment or federal
statutes? What considerations are important in determining whether in a
particular instance a defendant should be able to assert that the evidence being
introduced against him was illegally obtained? What constitutional and policy
considerations are relevant in assessing whether the present standing require-
ment is adequate to protect the defendant's rights? This article will discuss the
present state of the law and the constitutional, legal and policy considerations
which should be determinative of the future growth of the law in this area.
A common issue in every motion to exclude illegally obtained evidence is
whether the movant is a proper party to raise the claim of illegality and to
seek the remedy of exclusion. 1 This question is generally couched in terms of
* The original version of this article appears as part of the author's contribution to
LAW AND TACTICS IN EXCLUSIONARY HEARINGS by the E. Barrett Prettyman Fellows of
Georgetown University Law Center, to be published in March 1969 by Coiner Publica-
tions, Fairfax, Virginia.
* E. Barrett Prettyman Fellow at Georgetown University Law Center, 1966-68; B.S.,
Villanova University, 1962; LL.B., University of Virginia, 1965; LL.M., Georgetown
University Law Center, 1968; Member of the District of Columbia and Virginia bars.
1. Since Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), tangible evidence seized in
violation of the fourth amendment has been excluded from use in federal criminal trials.
The fourth amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures and forbids issuance
of warrants without a showing of probable cause.
In Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), the Court held that the fourth amendment
right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures and warrants issued on less
than probable cause applied to state law enforcement officers through the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. However, the Wolf Court refused to apply the
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"standing" to raise the issue; standing is one facet of a larger concept, justicia-
bility.2 Article three of the Constitution, which defines and limits the jurisdiction
of federal courts, proscribes adjudication of questions which do not present
"cases or controversies."3 Any question presenting a case or controversy is
considered "justiciable" in the constitutional sense.4 Status as case or contro-
versy is a fundamental prerequisite to establish standing. However, all rules
concerning standing are not constitutional in origin; some are court-imposed
restrictions on the federal judicial power, based upon policy considerations. 5
Unfortunately, these limitations are "not always clearly distinguished from
remedy of exclusion, created in Weeks, as a necessary part of fourteenth amendment due
process. This bifurcated approach was abandoned in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961), when the Court applied the exclusionary rule to state law enforcement officers
and state courts.
The exclusionary principle also applies to oral evidence gained as the result of an
illegal search and seizure. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). The
Court recently held that electronic eavesdropping and wiretapping, even absent technical
trespass, may violate the fourth amendment "right to privacy." Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347 (1967). Other intangible evidence such as eyewitness identifications may
be subject to the exclusionary rule if gained as a result of an illegal arrest or search.
See, e.g., People v. Stoner, 65 Cal. 2d 595, 422 P.2d 585, 55 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1967). In
this article, "illegal searches and seizures" refers to those violating federal statutes as
well as those inconsistent with the dictates of the fourth amendment. The federal courts,
in an exercise of their supervisory power, have applied the exclusionary rule as a remedy
for violations of certain statutes insuring the right to privacy which, though not consti-
tutional in origin, are relevant to the law of search and seizure.
In addition, violations of a federal statute may form the basis for a motion to suppress
evidence in state and federal courts. An example of such a statute is that prohibiting wire-
tapping. Communications Act of 1934 § 605, 48 Stat. 1064, 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1964);
see Lee v. Florida, 88 S. Ct. 2096 (1968); Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379
(1937). However, the requirement that an officer announce his authority and purpose
before breaking to enter under the Crime and Criminal Procedure Act of 1948 § 3109,
18 U.S.C. § 3109 (1964) is a basis for exclusion only in the federal courts. Compare
Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301 (1958), with Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23
(1963).
2. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968):
Justiciability is itself a concept of uncertain meaning and scope. Its reach is
illustrated by the various grounds upon which questions sought to be adjudicated
in federal courts have been held not to be justiciable. Thus, no justiciable
controversy is presented when the parties seek adjudication of only a political
question, when the parties are asking for an advisory opinion, when the ques-
tion sought to be adjudicated has been mooted by subsequent developments,
and when there is no standing to maintain the action. (Footnotes omitted.)
See also Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497,508 (1961).
3. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
4. Flast v. Cohen, supra note 2, at 94-95:
Embodied in the words "cases" and "controversies" are two complimentary
but somewhat different limitations. In part those words limit the business of
federal courts to questions presented in an adversary context and in a form
historically viewed as capable of resolution through the judicial process. And
in part those words define the role assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite
allocation of power to assure that the federal courts will not intrude into areas
committed to the other branches of government. Justiciability is the term of
art employed to give expression to this dual limitation placed upon federal
courts by the case-and-controversy doctrine.
5. See, e.g., Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 345-48 (1936) (concurring opinion).
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the constitutional limitation[s]. ' '6 General standing to sue requires that each
party have an adversary interest in the outcome, 7 and this constitutional limita-
tion must be distinguished from court-imposed limitations which determine
whether there is specific standing to raise certain issues within a lawsuit. In
a criminal case, the requirement of adversary posture is met whenever a
criminal charge has been brought, and once this posture is reached specific
standing to raise a certain issue becomes relevant. 8
Standing to suppress illegally obtained evidence is based upon a mixed bag
of historical and policy considerations. Basically, to establish specific standing,
counsel must show "a logical nexus between the status asserted and the claim
sought to be adjudicated." 9 In the context of illegal search and seizure,
"status" means defendant's relationship to the illegality claimed-whether
he was affected personally, financially or in some other direct manner. Failure
to find a direct relationship, however, need not always be fatal since the
importance of the "claim sought to be adjudicated" must also be evaluated.
When "status" and "claim" are considered together, the nature of the right
upon which the claim is based may be deemed important enough to justify
standing regardless of defendant's "status." 10
Instead of separating fourth amendment suppression from federal supervisory
suppression based upon statutes relevant to search and seizure, the whole
scope of search and seizure suppression, both constitutional and statutory, will
be discussed. Electronic eavesdropping and wiretapping present search and
seizure problems under the fourth amendment as well as under the federal
supervisory power.1 1 Insofar as the standing requirements in such cases are
analogous to other search and seizure claims, they will be discussed. Standing
6. Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255 (1953).
7. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), where the Court stated that the "guts"
of the standing requirement depends upon whether the party seeking relief "alleged such
a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness
which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions." Id. at 204.
8. For specific standing to raise a particular issue a party must have an adversary
posture regarding the issue. Flast v. Cohen, supra note 2, at 101. Regardless of the
circumstances of the motion to suppress, the nature of the proceedings should satisfy
this threshold requirement.
9. Id. at 102.
10. Id. at 99 n.20: "Thus, a general standing limitation imposed by federal courts is
that a litigant will ordinarily not be permitted to assert the rights of absent third parties.
[Citations omitted.] However, this rule has not been imposed uniformly as a firm consti-
tutional restriction on federal court jurisdiction."
11. Katz v. United States, supra note 1 (eavesdropping); Lee v. Florida, supra
note 1 (wiretapping). Generally, conversations overheard illegally by police presence
within the room are sufficient to give standing. See Katz v. United States, supra note I.
If the claim relates to "tapping" a phone conversation the general prerequisite to standing
is that the objecting party be one of the parties to the telephone connection. Goldstein v.
United States, 316 U.S. 114 (1942); Shimon v. United States, 352 F.2d 449 (D.C.
Cir. 1965). A person with a possessory interest in a dwelling may always object to the
illegal interception of telephone or other conversation emanating from the dwelling
[Vol. XVlii
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to suppress illegally obtained statements and eyewitness identifications will not
be treated, however, except where such evidence might be "tainted" by an
illegal search or seizure.1 2 Lastly, the future of the standing doctrine will be
discussed.
A claimant must establish specific standing in order to invoke exclusionary
rules relevant to illegal searches and seizures.1 3 The body of law surrounding
whether or not he is a party to the conversation or present during the interception. See
Baker v. United States, No. 21,154 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 9, 1968).
Because of the Court's language in Katz concerning the "expectation of privacy,"
persons who do not have a legally enforceable possessory interest in the premises may be
granted "special standing" to object to the illegal interception of any conversation or
telephone connection whether or not he is a party to the conversation or present at the
time of the interception. Baker v. United States, ibid. A co-defendant can suppress
illegally overheard conversations which the other defendant could challenge. Goldstein
v. United States, supra at 120. For a discussion of derivative standing, see pp. 172-76
infra.
12. Any defendant who has made self-incriminating statements has standing to object
to their admission into evidence if the statements were taken in violation of his fourth,
fifth or sixth amendment rights or, in the federal courts, in violation of Rule 5 (a) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. If the statement of a co-defendant contains
incriminating evidence against the defendant, courts are reluctant to admit the confes-
sion against the non-confessing defendant, whether or not the confession was illegally
obtained. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968). Nevertheless, it is generally
held that a defendant has no standing to object to the illegal method of obtaining a
confession of another. Anderson v. United States, 318 U.S. 350 (1943) ; but see Malinski
v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 411 (1945).
In certain cases illegally obtained statements may provide "probable cause" for a
subsequent search and seizure, but tangible evidence recovered in this manner is con-
sidered "tainted" and therefore inadmissible against the person from whom the state-
ment was obtained. See Wong Sun v. United States, supra note 1. Chief Justice Traynor
of the California Supreme Court has indicated that, at least in California where there
are no standing requirements for fourth amendment objections, the outcome of a co-
defendant's attempt to exclude tangible evidence procured as a result of a statement ob-
tained from another depends upon the "illegality" involved in obtaining the statement.
See People v. Varnum, 66 Cal. 2d 808, 812-13, 427 P.2d 772, 775-76, 59 Cal. Rptr. 108,
111-12 (1967), where he states:
The basis for the warnings required by Miranda is the privilege against
self-incrimination ... and that privilege is not violated when the information
elicited from an unwarned suspect is not used against him . . . . Similarly
the right to counsel protected by Escobedo . . . is not infringed when the
exclusion of any evidence obtained through the violation of the rules of [that
case] precludes any interference with the suspect's right to effective representa-
tion . . . .Unlike unreasonable searches and seizures, which always violate the
Constitution, there is nothing unlawful in questioning an unwarned suspect
so long as the police refrain from physically and psychologically coercive
tactics condemned by due process and do not use against the suspect any
evidence obtained.
But see id. at 815, 427 P.2d at 777, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 113 (concurring and dissenting
opinion of Justice Peters).
13. Exclusionary rules may be invoked when searches and seizures violate the Crime
and Criminal Procedure Act of 1948 § 3109, 18 U.S.C. § 3109 (1964) (failure to an-
nounce authority and purpose before entering) and when there is a violation of fourth
amendment rights. The considerations relevant to standing to invoke these rules are
the same in constitutional and federal supervisory cases. See Goldstein v. United States,
supra note 11.
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this requirement is complex 14 and, with the law of standing in such a state
of flux,1 5 this discussion must necessarily concern itself with a morass of con-
flicting opinions. 16
In its relation to the law of search and seizure, the standing requirement is
undesirable in several aspects: first, its genesis in the common law of property;
second, its misuse by many courts; and third, its prophylactic effect upon the
assertion of a basic constitutional right. Though the Supreme Court has at-
tempted to divorce standing from the illogic of property law, 17 many lower
courts have been slow to grasp and follow the evolution. Part of the blame
for the continued reliance upon irrelevant property law concepts must be
laid to the Supreme Court because of its failure to clearly set forth its view.
Even if a liberal interpretation of the Court's pronouncements on standing is
accepted, the requirement of standing often poses significant barriers to those
who challenge police disregard for the right to privacy. Since it is argued that
standing to suppress is not limited by any constitutional requirement, 18 to place
standing in the way of the vital and basic right to privacy is to place the cart
before the horse.
In federal and many state criminal cases, standing is premised upon the
judicial interpretation of Rule 41(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure, the "statutory direction governing the suppression of evidence acquired
in violation of the conditions validating a search."' 9 Rule 4 1 (e) states: "A
person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure may move the district court
14. The confusion stems from the historical fact that the fourth amendment was first
interpreted as conferring a personal right springing from an interest in property. Although
that concept has been eroded in favor of the right to privacy, many ancient real and
personal property rules remain embedded in the decisional history of the fourth amend-
ment. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 303-06 (1967).
15. See Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 389-92 (1968).
16. For further discussion of this conflict, see Weeks, Standing to Object in the Field
of Search and Seizure, 6 ARIZ. L. REV. 65 (1964) ; Sedler, Standing to Assert Constitu-
tional Jus Tertii in the Supreme Court, 71 YALE L.J. 599 (1962); Traynor, Mapp v.
Ohio At Large in the Fifty States, 1962 DUKE L.J. 319; Allen, The Wolf Case: Search
and Seizure, Federalism, and the Civil Liberties, 45 ILL. L. REV. 1 (1950); Grant,
Circumventing the Fourth Amendment, 14 S. CAL. L. REV. 359 (1941); Comment,
Standing to Object to an Unreasonable Search and Seizure, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 342
(1967); Note, Standing to Object to an Unlawful Search and Seizure, 1965 WASH.
U.L.Q. 488; Note, The Exclusionary Rule and the Question of Standing, 50 GEo. L.J. 585
(1962) ; Comment, Search and Seizure in Illinois: Enforcement of the Constitutional
Right of Privacy, 47 Nw. U.L. REV. 493 (1952).
17. See Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
18. See discussion pp. 162-63 infra.
19. Jones v. United States, supra note 17, at 260. The Jones Court did not specifically
mention the relationship between Rule 41 (e) and the potential scope of standing allow-
able under Article three of the Constitution. It is conceivable that the language of
Rule 41 (e), which grants only "aggrieved persons" standing, has restricted the Court
from exercising the full scope of its power to grant relief. However, it seems more
likely that the Court, rather than being restrained by the language of Rule 41(e), will
interpret "aggrieved persons" to include anyone who would, under present constitutional
doctrine, be permitted to raise the issue consistent with Article three. See Mancusi v.
DeForte, 392 U.S. 364 (1968), where the Court applied Jones, and held that a state
[Vol. XVIII
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for the district in which the property was seized for the return of the property
and to suppress for use as evidence . .." For purposes of this discussion, the
definition of a "person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure" is the
crucial issue. Where the claimant can show he is such person, he has established
a logical nexus between his status and the alleged illegality of the search and
seizure. Except for a limited number of exceptions noted later,20 only a "person
aggrieved" has standing to invoke and benefit from the exclusionary rule.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter set forth a definition of a person aggrieved when he
stated in Jones v. United States: 21
In order to qualify as a "person aggrieved by an unlawful search
and seizure" one must have been a victim of search or seizure, one
against whom the search was directed, as distinguished from one who
claims prejudice only through the use of evidence gathered as a con-
sequence of a search or seizure directed at someone else.22
Some courts, taking this statement out of context, have applied it literally23
and denied standing to persons who, though not direct "victims of search,"
should have qualified as "victims" in the context of the whole opinion and
decision in Jones.
The defendant has the burden of proving standing on a motion to suppress, 24
and there are four basic theories by which this standing may be established.
Although in a given case two or more theories might apply to the defendant,
only one theory need be relied upon and proved.25 Counsel should delineate
prisoner bringing a federal habeas corpus petition had standing to challenge an illegal
state search. Under the Mapp doctrine, the Court applied the standing requirement set
forth in Jones (and Rule 41 (e)) as a minimum standing rule applicable in state courts.
Of course, some states have broadened the standing definition to a point not yet recog-
nized by the Court as permissible. See, e.g., People v. Martin, 45 Cal. 2d 755, 290 P.2d
855 (1955).
20. See pp. 172-76 infra.
21. Supra note 17.
22. Id. at 261.
23. Seay v. United States, 380 F.2d 358 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1047
(1968) ; Stewart v. State, I Md. App. 309, 229 A.2d 727 (Ct. Spec. App. 1967) ; Ball
v. State, 194 So. 2d 502 (1967); State v. Nobles, 79 N.J. Super. 442, 191 A.2d 793
(App. Div. 1963) ; State v. Loran, 62 Wash. 2d 4, 380 P.2d 733 (1963).
24. Jones v. United States, supra note 17, at 261.
25. In Jones, the theories of standing, though not mutually exclusive, were independent.
"Two separate lines of thought effectively sustain defendant's standing in this case."
Id. at 263. One commentary has explained it as follows:
In the Jones case the defendant's privacy had been invaded by the federal
officers' search of the apartment in which he was staying. In addition, he was
charged with a crime of possession. However, the first rationale that afforded
standing to the defendant was dependent solely upon the charge of possession
and the existence of the dilemma, and in no way rested upon a finding of
invasion of privacy of the defendant.
Note, Standing to Object to an Unlawful Search and Seizure, 1965 WASH. U.L.Q.
488, 493.
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and establish standing under all theories available to him in a given case,
however, since the law is unsettled and necessary facts might be difficult to
prove. The four viable theories of standing are: (a) automatic standing; 26 (b)
standing based on interest in the premises searched;27 (c) standing based on
interest in the property seized;28 and (d) derivative standing.29 Derivative
standing is a step-child of the other three categories to the extent that it
partially relies upon the breach of another person's privacy.
A. Automatic Standing
Prior to Jones a person established standing to object to an unlawful search
and seizure only if he showed a possessory or proprietary interest in the
property seized or the premises searched.30 As Judge Learned Hand noted,
this rule forced many defendants to prove the government's case in order to
make a preliminary showing of standing.3 1 Furthermore, the government was
allowed to adopt the contradictory positions of both challenging standing based
on a possessory interest at a motion to suppress and then proving possession at
trial.32 Until recently, it was possible for the government to use defendant's
statements, made in his attempt to establish standing, against him at trial.
33
The Jones decision partially eliminated this dilemma by creating the concept
of automatic standing. In Jones, the defendant was charged with violating two
narcotic laws.34 The first count allowed conviction upon a showing that the
defendant possessed narcotics not bearing appropriate tax stamps; the second
count required only proof of unexplained possession of narcotics. As Mr.
Justice Frankfurter noted, "[p]ossession was the basis of the Government's
26. This theory requires no invasion of the defendant's privacy. Jones v. United
States, supra note 17, at 263-65.
27. This theory requires that the defendant be legally on the property searched or
that he have some other legal claim in the property. Id. at 265-67.
28. This theory requires only that the property seized be the defendant's and that
it be seized from a place to which he has legal access. United States v. Jeffers, 342
U.S. 48, 51-52 (1951).
29. This theory in effect relies on the violation of another's right to privacy which,
under certain cases, can be asserted by a third party prejudiced by the illegal police
conduct. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948).
30. Jones v. United States, supra note 17, at 261.
31. Connolly v. Medalie, 58 F.2d 629, 630 (2d Cir. 1932):
Men may wince at admitting that they were the owners, or in possession, of
contraband property; may wish at once to secure the remedies of a possessor,
and avoid the perils of the part; but equivocation will not serve. If they come
as victims, they must take on that role, with enough detail to cast them without
question. The petitioners at bar shrank from that predicament; but they were
obliged to choose one horn of the dilemma.
32. Jones v. United States, supra note 17, at 263-64.
33. Ibid. This, of course, is no longer true. Simmons v. United States, supra note 15.
34. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 4704(a) (purchasing, selling, or distributing narcotics
not from original stamped package); Narcotic Drugs Import and Export Act of 1956
§ 105, 70 Stat. 570, 21 U.S.C. § 174 (1964) (facilitating concealment and sale of
narcotics).
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case against [Jones]."' 35 Because the defendant failed to allege either owner-
ship or possession of the narcotics seized, the lower courts denied him standing
to challenge the search.36 The Court agreed that "[o]rdinarily ... it is entirely
proper to require of one who seeks to challenge the legality of a search . . .
that he allege, and if [necessary] . . . establish, that he himself was the victim
of an invasion of privacy." 37 However, the Court noted the "special problem"
of such a requirement in cases where the prosecution is based on the fact
of possession. Prior to Jones, the defendant would have been required to admit
either ownership or possession of the narcotics in order to challenge the search.38
To eliminate the dilemma inherent in a possession charge, the Court held
that: "The same element in this prosecution which has caused a dilemma, i.e.,
that possession both convicts and confers standing, eliminates any necessity for
a preliminary showing of an interest in the premises searched or the property
seized, which ordinarily is required when standing is challenged." 39
The Court proceeded to explain the rationale of automatic standing, a
doctrine preventing the "[g]overnment [from having] the advantage of contra-
dictory positions as a basis for conviction." 4° Mr. Justice Frankfurter reasoned
that the prosecution's reliance on the benefits of the dilemma allowed the de-
fendant to be "subjected . . . to the penalties meted out to one in lawless
possession while refusing him the remedies designed for one in that situation."4 1
Since such a contradiction was "not consonant with the amenities . . . of the
administration of criminal justice" 42 the Court held that: "[i]n cases where the
indictment itself charges possession, the defendant in a very real sense is
revealed as a 'person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure' . . . .
As clear as this admonition appears, some lower courts have had difficulty in
interpreting and implementing it. Cases arising under this doctrine can be
broken into four categories based on the relationship of the property seized
to the crime charged: first, crimes of possession of contraband per se; second,
crimes of possession of derivative contraband; third, theft crimes in which
stolen objects are seized; and fourth, crimes in which the items seized are of
less evidential value.44
35. Jones v. United States, supra note 17, at 258.
36. Jones v. United States, 262 F.2d 234 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
37. Jones v. United States, supra note 17, at 261.
38. Ibid.




43. Id. at 264.
44. This breakdown is found in Note, Standing to Object to an Unlawful Search and
Seizure. 1965 WASH. U.L.Q. 488, 493-97.
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1. Contraband Per Se
Where the charge against the defendant is possession of contraband per se45
Jones clearly held that standing is automatically established and the Court
recently reaffirmed that holding in dicta.46 Nevertheless, there are few decisions
granting standing automatically in such cases, 47 and several cases have denied
it to defendants charged with crimes of possession.48 Many cases grant auto-
matic standing as an alternate holding where another theory of standing is
found,49 while a number of decisions acknowledge the automatic standing
rule in dicta.50
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Plazola v. United States51 perhaps adhered
the most faithfully to the doctrine of automatic standing in contraband per se
cases. In Plazola, defendant was charged with importing and concealing nar-
cotics. The prosecution based its case on 58 pounds of marijuana found in a
car driven by Singh and one seed of marijuana found in the defendant's car.
When the Singh car was searched the defendant was at least two miles away,
but the court granted Plazola standing to attack the search of Singh's car even
though there was no showing that Plazola's privacy had been invaded. The
basis for the holding, although not clearly articulated by the court, seems to
45. "Contraband per se" means any object which by its nature may not be possessed
legally without special permission. Generally, narcotics and certain dangerous weapons
fall into this category.
46. Simmons v. United States, supra note 15.
47. See United States v. Lewis, 227 F. Supp. (S.D.N.Y. 1964); United States v.
Thomas, 216 F. Supp. 942 (N.D. Cal. 1963). Neither case offers much in the way of
substantial precedent. In Lewis the defendant was charged with possession of heroin.
The court held that she had automatic standing to suppress because the charge was a
crime of possession. Nevertheless, her motion to suppress was denied on an abandonment
theory since the facts showed she had thrown the heroin out of an apartment window.
In Thomas, the defendant was arrested near a still in an old house. There was no
showing that the house was on the property owned by co-defendant Becker nor that
any of the seized property belonged to any of the co-defendants. Defendant Becker was
charged with illegal possession of a still and automatic standing was granted to challenge
the search of the house. The court partially based its holding on Plazola v. United
States, 291 F.2d 56 (9th Cir. 1961) and Diaz-Rosendo v. United States, 357 F.2d 124
(9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 856 (1966).
48. See cases cited note 23 supra.
49. Rosencranz v. United States, 334 F.2d 738 (1st Cir. 1964) (concurring opinion);
United States v. Holt, 306 F.2d 198 (6th Cir. 1962) ; Contreras v. United States, 291
F.2d 63 (9th Cir. 1961) (defendant found in car with contraband) ; People v. Rowland,
36 Ill. 2d 311, 223 N.E.2d 113 (1967) ; People v. Mayo, 19 Ill. 2d 136, 166 N.E.2d
440 (1960); State v. Bernius, 177 Ohio St. 155, 203 N.E.2d 241 (1964); State v.
Michaels, 60 Wash. 2d 638, 374 P.2d 989 (1962); State v. Evans, 75 N.J. Super. 319,
183 A.2d 137 (App. Div. 1962).
50. E.g., United States v. Beigel, 370 F.2d 751 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 930
(1967); United States v. Konigsberg, 336 F.2d 844 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S.
933 (1964) ; United States v. Wood, 270 F. Supp. 963 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) ; State v. Pokini,
45 Hawaii 295, 367 P.2d 499 (1961).
51. 291 F.2d56 (9th Cir. 1961).
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be the automatic standing rule in Jones.52 The court footnoted the Jones
language on automatic standing and later stated that the defendant had
standing to challenge the search and seizure as the person aggrieved by it. It
seems that the court believed that automatic standing is established where the
charge is contraband per se, regardless of whether the government's theory is
possession.
In Diaz-Rosendo v. United States,53 the Ninth Circuit repudiated the Plazola
reasoning. The defendants in Diaz-Rosendo were charged with conspiracy to
illegally import marijuana. A co-conspirator, Contreras, was stopped by im-
migration authorities who searched his automobile and uncovered a large
amount of marijuana. The defendants had been following Contreras' car in
another automobile and were later arrested, no narcotics being found in their
possession. Neither defendants' conviction was based on possession of mari-
juana,54 and the court of appeals held that neither defendant had standing to
object to the search of the Contreras car. 55 The court, although not agreeing
with the Plazola reasoning, stated that the decision itself was correct and
consonant with Jones since the trial court record disclosed a fact not stated or
relied upon by the circuit court-that the government relied upon a theory of
constructive possession.
The decisions which limit the applicability of the automatic standing rule
make one basic mistake. Almost uniformly they read Mr. Justice Frankfurter's
"victim of the search" language as a simplistic requirement for standing.56 A
proper reading of Jones clearly reveals that a "victim" of a search includes not
only those against whom the search was directed in a physical sense but also
in a litigational sense.
2. Derivative Contraband
Automatic standing has not been confined to charges of contraband per se.
Logically, the same rule should cover the class of cases involving possession
52. The marijuana seized from Singh's car was introduced to show that Plazola and
his co-defendant were privy to the smuggling scheme as aiders and abettors. Proof of
the crime hinged mainly upon a showing of constructive "possession" which was imputed
to Plazola and his co-defendant.
53. 357 F.2d 124 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 856 (1966).
54. Id. at 132.
55. Id. at 133:
We believe, in light of the facts stated in the opinion, the holding of this
court in Plazola with respect to the issue of "standing" as it relates to the
marijuana seized in the search of the automobile of Singh is not consonant
with the teachings in Jones and Wong Sun. However, facts not stated in the
opinion, but disclosed by the record, reveal that the holding in Plazola is
correct and is consonant with the teachings in Jones and Wong Sun. The
record discloses that in obtaining Plazola's conviction the Government relied
upon the theory that Plazola had constructive possession of the marijuana in
Singh's car. . . To the extent that the language in Plazola is inconsistent with
the present holding it is disapproved.
56. See, e.g., Diaz-Rosendo v. United States, supra note 53.
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of derivative contraband.57 In these cases the items seized are not intrinsically
contraband but proof of possession of the items is sufficient to obtain a con-
viction. Two federal courts have applied automatic standing to derivative
contraband charges, 58 but there is authority denying such standing 9 on the
ground that possession was only one element of the crime charged. These
latter cases limit Jones to its facts; however, it should be recalled that at least
one of the charges in Jones required a showing of something more than
possession.60 When the main issue in the prosecution's case is possession, the
spirit of Jones compels application of the automatic standing rule.61
3. Fruits of a Theft
A somewhat more attenuated class of cases consists of theft crimes such as
robbery, larceny and burglary, which may require proof of the defendant's
possession of the stolen goods. 62 Possession of the stolen goods is often the most
crucial evidence against the defendant, and at least two courts have extended
the concept of automatic standing to cover such situations. 63
In both cases, the theory of the prosecution was based upon possession of
either contraband or the fruit of a crime.64 In United States ex rel. Coffey v.
Fay,6 5 the court was most concerned with the fact that a denial of standing
would allow the prosecution to benefit from inconsistent positions taken at the
motion to suppress and at trial.66 Despite the logic of the position adopted in
57. For example, the fruits of a theft from interstate commerce would fall in this
category when the defendant is charged with unlawful possession of goods stolen from
interstate commerce.
58. Simpson v. United States, 346 F.2d 291 (10th Cir. 1965); Bourg v. United
States, 286 F.2d 124 (5th Cir. 1960).
59. E.g., United States v. Konigsberg, supra note 50.
60. INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 4704(a). An added element is proof that the narcotics
did not bear the appropriate taxpaid stamps. See CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTION FOR THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA § 93 (1966).
61. In Jones the Court noted that "Rule 41(e) should not be applied to allow the
Government to deprive the defendant of standing to bring a motion to suppress by
framing the indictment in general terms, while prosecuting for possession." (footnote
omitted.) Jones v. United States, supra note 17, at 264-65.
62. See, e.g., Simmons v. United States, supra note 15.
63. United States ex rel. Coffey v. Fay, 344 F.2d 625 (2d Cir. 1965); Lanier v.
State, 219 Tenn. 417, 410 S.W.2d 411 (1966).
64. In Coffey two defendants were arrested while in a car. They were searched outside
of the car and stolen jewels were found on one of them. The Second Circuit held that the
defendant who did not have any fruits of the crime on his person had standing to
suppress the fruits found on his partner when the charge was burglary.
65. Supra note 63.
66. Id. at 628-29:
We hold that under these circumstances the search which brought the stolen
jewels to light was "directed against" Coffey as well as DeNormand. More
precisely, we hold that the State may not arrest, search, and prosecute a de-
fendant on the theory that he is in possession of stolen property, and then
object that the property was actually found on the person of a companion when
the defendant moves to prevent use of the property as evidence against him.
[Vol. XVIII
Suppression of Illegally Obtained Evidence
Coffey, several courts have refused to extend Jones to cases not involving
charges of possession of contraband.67 If procedure is not to be exhalted over
substance, the government's theory of the case, rather than the form of the
charge, should be controlling.
4. Evidentiary Items
The last category of cases in which automatic standing is relevant involves
standing to suppress introduction of objects which tend to establish one or
more elements of the crime but which are neither contraband nor fruits of
the crime. These items may be classified as "merely evidentiary" and could in-
clude marked money used in the sale of narcotics,68 clothing worn during the
commission of a crime or any other object which provides a damaging evi-
dentiary link between defendant and the crime. Thus far, courts have been
reluctant to extend the automatic standing rule to such cases,69 and even
those commentators in favor of extending Jones beyond its facts admit that
application of the automatic standing rule to these cases would be a "sub-
stantial extension" of the rule. 70 Since recent Supreme Court cases indicate that
the standing requirement has not yet been abrogated, 71 it seems that where
merely evidentiary items are seized, the defendant does not have the benefit of
the automatic standing rule.
In sum, the concept of automatic standing has not been well received by
the majority of courts. The reticence of courts to implement the automatic
standing rule in situations where the prosecution's case is based on possession
of contraband per se or derivative contraband seems unjustifiable. Extension
of the automatic standing concept to cases involving the seizure of fruits of a
theft or merely evidentiary items presents a more difficult problem. Although
Simmons v. United States72 reaffirmed the automatic standing concept in dicta,
the decision signaled no extension of the rule. Simmons did, however, excise
one bad effect of the dilemma by holding that statements made by the de-
fendant to establish standing were inadmissible against the defendant at trial. 73
67. See, e.g., People v. Kelley, 23 I1. 2d 193, 177 N.E.2d 830 (1961); People v.
DeFilippis, 54 Ill. App. 2d 137, 203 N.E.2d 627 (1964).
68. Ramirez v. United States, 294 F.2d 277 (9th Cir. 1961).
69. See State v. Pokini, supra note 50.
70. See, e.g., Note, Standing to Object to an Unlawful Search and Seizure, 1965
WASH. U.L.Q. 488.
71. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968); Jones v. United States, 362
U.S. 257 (1960).
72. 390 U.S. 377, 390 (1968).
73. Id. at 394. It is possible that such testimony may not even be admissible for
purposes of impeachment. Justice Black, dissenting in Simmons v. United States, id.
at 398, stated:
The consequence of the Court's holding, it seems to me, is that defendants are
encouraged to come into court, either in person or through other witnesses,
and swear falsely that they do not own property, knowing at the very moment
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The unsettled state of the law in this area provides an opportunity for
imaginative defense counsel to claim applicability of the automatic standing
doctrine. Regardless of cases to the contrary, the validity of the rule cannot be
disputed. Once a court is forced to recognize the principle, counsel should
argue the importance to the prosecution's case of either actual or constructive
possession of the seized item, relying on the elements of the offense and the
inferences that a jury could draw from possession. By requesting a bill of par-
ticulars counsel can force the prosecution to admit that reliance will be placed
on possession of the seized item. Even where these tactics are unsuccessful, if
during the trial the government emphasizes defendant's possession of the seized
article, counsel could request the court to reconsider an earlier ruling denying
automatic standing.
B. Standing Based Upon Relationship to the Situs of the Search
Since the defendant's relationship to the situs of the search is often the basis
for his standing to object to the search,74 courts must be concerned with two
issues: whether the search and seizure was directed at a "constitutionally pro-
tected area," and whether the defendant's presence at the situs or his interest
in the area searched is sufficient. The case law surrounding both concepts was
hopelessly confused and burdened by irrelevant and ancient property law
rules, 75 but several recent cases have done much toward promoting a definable
test for standing based on defendant's relationship to the situs of the search.
Grave doubts have been cast on the requirement that the defendant show
that the area searched was "constitutionally protected." Although the fourth
amendment purports to protect only "persons, houses, papers and effects,"
courts have liberally applied the prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures to insure against the invasion of personal privacy, regardless of the
physical surroundings of the searched area. 76 Recently in Katz v. United
that they do so they have already sworn precisely the opposite in a prior court
proceeding. This is but to permit lawless people to play ducks and drakes with
the basic principles of the administration of criminal law.
But see Blair v. United States, 401 F.2d 387 (D.C. Cir. 1968) ; Bailey v. United States,
389 F.2d 305, 311 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Comment, Standing to Object to an Unreasonable
Search and Seizure, 34 U. Cut. L. REV. 342 (1967).
74. This concept flows from common law property rules based upon trespass to real
property. See general discussion in Edwards, Standing to Suppress Unreasonably
Seized Evidence, 47 Nw. U.L. REV. 471 (1952).
75. See Weeks, Standing to Object in the Field of Search and Seizure, 6 ARIz. L. REV.
65, 67-70 (1964).
76. See G. SHADOAN, LAW AND TACTICS IN FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES 31 (1964)
where the author notes: "the courts have applied the protection well beyond the literal
meaning of the Amendment and have included, among other things, business offices,
hotel rooms, and automobiles." See Work v. United States, 243 F.2d 660 (D.C. Cir.
1957) (trash can) ; see generally Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 143-44 (1962).
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States,77 government agents attached an electronic listening device to the out-
side of a public telephone booth and recorded defendant's conversations. On
appeal, counsel questioned whether a telephone booth was a constitutionally
protected area 78 but the Court rejected the formulation of the issue in those
terms, stating that, "the correct solution of Fourth Amendment problems is
not necessarily promoted by incantation of the phrase 'constitutionally pro-
tected area.'-79 Mr. Justice Holmes' exclusion of an open field beyond the
curtilage of the dwelling8 0 from the scope of the fourth amendment on the
ground that it is not a constitutionally protected area has never been overruled;
however, lower court opinions as well as decisions by the Supreme Court have
greatly eroded the viability of this limitation.81
Until Jones it was generally accepted that the defendant must have a
possessory or proprietary interest in the premises searched to challenge the
search. This rule precluded guests, invitees, licensees, employees and others
legally on the premises from objecting to flagrant illegality.82 Jones abrogated
this requirement as the test for a "person aggrieved" by the search. In Jones,
the defendant was found in an apartment leased by Evans, who was not there
at the time of the search. Jones testified that he was a friend of Evans and was
on the premises with Evans' permission. He also stated that his home was else-
where, that he paid no rent for the apartment, that he kept a shirt and suit
at the apartment and that he had slept there "maybe a night." 83 On the basis
of this testimony, the trial court held that Jones had an insufficient interest in
77. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
78. Id. at 349.
79. .d. at 350. See Mancusi v. De Forte, 392 U.S. 364 (1968).
80. In Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924), revenue agents trespassed on the
defendant's land, hid within one hundred yards of the house, and observed defendant,
standing outside the house, handing a bottle of whiskey to another. When the two men
saw the agents, they ran, dropping the bottle while fleeing. The Court, through Mr.
Justice Holmes, held that the special protection of the fourth amendment did not extend
to "the open fields" and accordingly admitted the bottle into evidence. Id. at 59.
81. See Katz v. United States, supra note 77, at 353: "[O]nce it is recognized that
the Fourth Amendment protects people-and not simply "areas"-against unreasonable
searches and seizures, it becomes clear that the reach of that Amendment cannot turn
upon the presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any given enclosure." See G.
SHADOAN, supra note 76, at 32-33.
82. Edwards, supra note 74, at 476-77:
Where the defendant is neither the owner nor the lessee of the premises
searched, but is indicted for illegal activity conducted upon the searched
premises, his standing to challenge the search is uniformly denied. Within
this category, three variations of interests have been presented for adjudication
[trespassers, trespasser with interest, and invitee], and in all three the courts
have denied defendants' standing.
Only upon very rare occasions will the federal courts permit an employee to
suppress evidence resulting from an unreasonable search and seizure of the
employer's property. [Footnote omitted.]
83. Jones v. United States, supra note 71, at 259.
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the searched premises to object to the seizure of the narcotics found on an
awning outside the window.
The Court, recognizing that the trial court's decision closely followed "the
prevailing view in the lower courts," rejected that rule because of misplaced
reliance on "subtle distinctions, developed and refined by the common law
in evolving the body of private property law which, more than almost any
other branch of the law, has been shaped by distinctions whose validity is largely
historical."8 4 The Court then set forth a new test for standing: "anyone
legitimately on premises where a search occurs may challenge its legality by way
of a motion to suppress, when its fruits are proposed to be used against him.
This would of course not avail those who, by virtue of their wrongful presence,
cannot invoke the privacy of the premises searched."' 5
Accordingly, the Court held that Jones had standing to challenge the search
of Evans' apartment because he was legitimately on the premises at the time
of the search. The ruling recognized that privacy is a right of the lawful
occupier of the situs and, as such, should be afforded to those the owner sees
fit to permit on the premises.8 6 All, save trespassers, seem to fall within this
broad protection.87 Insofar as this rule applies to fixed premises such as houses
and outbuildings, the courts have uniformly followed Jones.88 Since Jones,
defendants have been able to establish standing based on relationship to situs
of the search by proving either a present possessory interest in the property
searched, or legitimate presence on the property at the time of the alleged
search.
1. Present Possessory Interest in the Property Searched
[T]he Amendment does not shield only those who have title to the
searched premises. It was settled even before our decision in Jones v.
United States, that one with a possessory interest in the premises
might have standing. 89
Although Jones did not deal with the issue, it is clear that one with a
present possessory interest, whether owner, occupant or lessee of a house or
84. Id. at 266.
85. Id. at 267.
86. In Mancusi v. De Forte, supra note 79, at 368 the Court stated: "[C]apacity to
claim the protection of the Amendment depends not upon a property right in the
invaded place but upon whether the area was one in which there was a reasonable
expectation of freedom from governmental intrusion."
87. To this extent the former rule seems unchanged. See United States v. Friedman,
166 F. Supp. 786 (D.N.J. 1958); United States v. Pete, 111 F. Supp. 292
(D.D.C. 1953). See also Edwards, supra note 74, at 476.
88. See, e.g., Belton v. State, 228 Md. 17, 178 A.2d 409 (1962).
89. Mancusi v. De Forte, supra note 79, at 367-68 (Citation omitted.)
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apartment, need not be present at the time of the search in order to challenge
its validity.90 This same rule applies to occupants of hotel rooms,91 where
standing is based upon property interest and as such does not depart from the
rule in existence prior to Jones.92 However, a person may have a proprietary
interest in property without having standing to object to a search. The cases
import a concept of privacy accruing to the person entitled to be free from
trespass, and therefore deny an absent landlord standing to object to a search
of a lessee's house.93 This rule is appropriate except in cases where the charge
is one such as maintaining a nuisance or running a bawdy house. Here, an
absent landlord could raise an objection to an illegal search under the auto-
matic standing provision of Jones94 and should be allowed to establish standing
on the basis of his proprietary interest.
The precise meaning of a present possessory interest is not as clear as some
cases seem to indicate. 95 Consistent with the Supreme Court's rejection of
property law concepts, some courts have rejected a strict interpretation of
this requirement in an attempt to vindicate the right to privacy.96 Thus,
90. Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961); Morrison v. United States,
262 F.2d 449 (D.C. Cir. 1958). See Henzel v. United States, 296 F.2d 650 (5th Cir.
1961). Henzel was the president and sole stockholder of a corporation. The books and
records of the company were illegally seized from his office, which was owned by the
corporation. At the time of the search the defendant was not in the building. The Fifth
Circuit held that he had standing to suppress the records even though he was not on the
premises, reasoning that "legitimately on the premises" was not an all-inclusive formula
because it would deny an absent home owner the right to object to a search of his
house when he was not present. See Foster v. United States, 281 F.2d 310 (8th Cir.
1960).
91. Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964). See Mancusi v. De Forte, supra note
79, at 367, where the Court stated, "the word 'houses,' as it appears in the Amendment,
is not to be taken literally, and ... the protection of the Amendment may extend to com-
mercial premises."
92. See Weeks, Standing to Object in the Field of Search and Seizure, 6 ARIZ. L. REV.
65 (1964) ; Edwards, supra note 74.
93. See People v. DeFilippis, 54 Ill. App. 2d 137, 203 N.E.2d 627 (1964). See also
United States v. Konigsberg, supra note 59. This concept is best explained by Mr. Justice
Harlan in Mancusi v. DeForte, supra note 79, at 368:
The Court's recent decision in Katz v. United States . . . also makes it clear
that capacity to claim the protection of the Amendment depends not upon a
property right in the invaded place but upon whether the area was one in which
there was a reasonable expectation of freedom from governmental intrusion.
94. The theory that the prosecution can charge sufficient ties to the house to make out
a case of maintaining such an establishment and at the same time deny that the de-
fendant has standing to challenge the search of the house is as inconsistent with the
amenities of justice as the dilemma Jones faced. Moreover, it would seem that occupants
visiting such an establishment and charged with presence would likewise have automatic
standing without claiming to be legitimately on the premises. See Jones v. United States,
supra note 71.
95. E.g., United States v. Konigsberg, supra note 59 (sublessor of garage had no
standing).
96. See Baker v. United States, No. 21,154 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 9, 1968); United States
v. Paroutian, 299 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1962).
1968]
Catholic University Law Review
though a lessee's possessory interest ceases to exist when the lease is terminated,9 7
a search subsequent to the expiration of a lease has been successfully challenged
by a former lessee. 98 Moreover, the District of Columbia Circuit found "special
standing" to suppress all conversations (even those to which the defendant was
not a party and which occurred when he was not present) illegally overheard
in a hotel suite which was neither paid for by the defendant nor rented in his
name. The court held that defendant's interest in the suite reasonably war-
ranted his expectation of freedom from governmental intrusion. 9
Defendant's abandonment of premises is a problem frequently encountered
when defining a present possessory interest. At least two courts, specifically
citing abandonment as the controlling factor, held that a lessee had no present
possessory interest and thus no standing to assert illegality, even though the
lease had not expired and the rent was paid.1° In these two cases police did
not know that abandonment had occurred until after the search was made.
Abandonment of premises, if known to the police before the search, may be
grounds for finding the search reasonable under the fourth amendment.10'
Recognition of the distinction between knowledge and ignorance of abandon-
ment at the time of the search is crucial, however, if courts are to give any
meaning to the policy of deterring illegal police conduct which underlies the
exclusionary rule.102
A court's characterization of abandonment is important. If abandonment
is relevant to standing, then the court is free to inquire into all facts which
demonstrate the defendant's intention to abandon the dwelling. Naturally,
97. See Fisher v. United States, 324 F.2d 775 (8th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S.
999 (1964).
98. United States v. Paroutian, supra note 96. Here, though the police twice entered
the defendant's apartment without a warrant, no physical evidence was seized during
either search. The police, however, did observe what appeared to be a wall panel in a
closet. After the defendant was dispossessed of his apartment for failure to pay rent, the
police again entered the apartment and discovered incriminating evidence behind the
false panel. The court held that the defendant was "legitimately on the premises" though
not actually present during the first two searches. Therefore, the court found that the
seizure of the evidence was tainted by the first two illegal searches. Though this case
is more properly dismissed under the category of "legitimately on the premises," it also
shows the court's willingness to invoke a relation back theory to define a present pos-
sessory interest.
99. Baker v. United States, supra note 96. The defendant had a key to Black's hotel
suite and was "welcome" to use it. Baker used the suite for meetings and to make
telephone calls.
100. Parman v. United States, 399 F.2d 559 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
37 U.S.L.W. 3135 (U.S. Oct. 14, 1968); Feguer v. United States, 302 F.2d 214 (8th
Cir. 1962). Generally there are two types of abandonment, abandonment of premises
and abandonment of personal property. In cases dealing with the latter, the fact that
items are abandoned makes police conduct reasonable and vitiates the finding of a
seizure in the constitutional sense. See Caldwell v. United States, 338 F.2d 385 (8th
Cir. 1964).
101. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960).
102. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 629-35 (1965).
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these facts may include actions not known to the police at the time of the
search. 10 3 If, on the other hand, the court characterizes abandonment as a
factor in determining reasonableness of a search, the judge is restricted to
considering only those facts known to the police at the time of the search. With
the recent emphasis on the irrelevance of property concepts and the im-
portance of deterring illegal police action, an ex post facto approach certainly
ignores the thrust of exclusionary rules and encourages the police to act
lawlessly on the chance that they later might be able to show an abandon-
ment.1°4 Because the doctrine of abandonment is not firmly rooted in any im-
mutable principle, its use should be consistent with the basic policy under-
lying enforcement of the fourth amendment, and abandonment should thus
be considered as relevant only to the reasonableness of police conduct.
10 5
2. Persons Legitimately on the Premises
Although the courts have been faithful to the "legitimate presence" rule in
Jones, they have been reluctant to extend it. Cases following Jones require
that the defendant bear the burden of proving his legitimate presence, 10 6 and
usually require presence at the time of the search in order to grant a "guest"
standing to object. 10 7 Employees, mere invitees, guests and licensees have no
difficulty establishing standing if they were present at the time of the search
and the items seized are offered against them as evidence in a criminal case. 108
103. "The defense suggests that a search which is illegal is not made justifiable by
what the search discloses and the question of legality is to be determined only by the
circumstances which exist at the time of the search." Feguer v. United States, supra
note 100, at 248.
104. The burden is on the government to show the abandonment and the courts
will not presume abandonment. See Friedman v. United States, 347 F.2d 697, 701 (8th
Cir. 1965).
105. E.g., United States v. Lewis, 227 F. Supp. 433 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); People v.
James, 46 Misc. 2d 138, 259 N.Y.S. 2d 241 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
106. See United States v. Konigsberg, supra note 50, at 847.
107. Persons who were transient guests and left the premises prior to the search have
been denied standing. Commonwealth v. Raymond, 412 Pa. 194, 194 A.2d 150 (1963),
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 999 (1964); United States ex rel. Puntari v. Maroney, 220 F.
Supp. 801 (W.D. Pa. 1963). It is submitted that these cases do not actually turn on
standing. In Raymond the defendant, who infrequently visited his cousin's apartment,
left the fruits of a robbery there. The court held that at the time of the search the de-
fendant had "vacated" the apartment and "abandoned" the evidence, stating that Abel
v. United States, supra note 101, controlled. "This room, therefore, was not a place
where he can claim the constitutional immunity from search and seizure .... " Com-
monwealth v. Raymond, supra at 201, 194 A.2d at 153.
In Puntari, defendant visited his parents' home at Christmas and left for good on
February 1, 1960. Later the police, obtaining his parents' permission to search the
house, uncovered evidence of a robbery. The defendant did not claim that the evidence
belonged to him. The court held that he "had no possessory interest in the premises
either as a guest or invitee." United States ex rel. Puntari v. Maroney, supra at 806.
108. See Mancusi v. De Forte, supra note 79. As Mr. Justice Harlan pointed out,
this principle is based upon the expectation of privacy from legitimate presence on the
premises. In Mancusi, defendant De Forte was a union official present in the union
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Several courts have interpreted "legitimately on the premises" in such a
manner as to insure the right to privacy. In Garza-Fuentes v. United States,10 9 a
federal customs agent, prior to the search, consented to the breaking into
his room by police. The defendants were lured to the customs agent's room
with incriminating evidence and then the police broke into the room and
seized the defendant's heroin. Defendants were granted standing to challenge
the manner of entry and the reasonableness of the search.
A more difficult question arises when the search is directed at an automobile.
Prior to Jones, many courts held that passengers and bailees at the time of
the search did not have sufficient interest in the vehicle to object to the
search.'10 With few exceptions standing is now granted to passengers and to
persons driving a car with the owner's permission, whether or not the owner
is present. 111 This is a logical application of Jones. Standing is also granted to
owners not present at the time of search or seizure. 112 A strict application of
Jones would seem to deny standing to drivers and passengers of a stolen car.
At least two courts have held such persons akin to trespassers and specifically
excluded by Jones.113 The proper view seems to be that expressed in Cotton v.
offices when the police entered and illegally seized union files in the office. The Court
said that had the records been taken from De Forte's private office he would have
standing to suppress because "[he] would have been entitled to expect that he would not
be disturbed except by personal or business invitees, and that records would not be
taken except with his permission or that of his union superiors." Id. at 369.
The Court held that De Forte had standing to suppress and went on to point out
that the necessary expectation of privacy need not be absolute:
Like De Forte, [the defendant in Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960)]
had little expectation of absolute privacy, since the owner and those authorized
by him were free to enter. There was no indication that the area of the apart-
ment near the bird's nest had been set off for Jones' personal use, so that he
might have expected more privacy there than in the rest of the apartment; in
this, it was like the part of De Forte's office where the union records were kept.
Id. at 370.
109. 400 F.2d 219 (5th Cir. 1968); see also United States v. Partoutian, supra
note 96, at 488.
110. See Shurman v. United States, 219 F.2d 282, 288 (5th Cir. 1955); Mabee v.
United States, 60 F.2d 209, 212 (3d Cir. 1932). But see United States v. Chieppa, 241
F.2d 635, 637-38 (2d Cir. 1957).
111. E.g., United States v. Peisner, 311 F.2d 94, 105 (4th Cir. 1962) (passenger);
United States v. Festa, 192 F. Supp. 160, 164 (D. Mass. 1960) (bailee).
112. E.g., United States v. Eldridge, 302 F.2d 463, 464-65 (4th Cir. 1962):
On the . . . question of Eldridge's standing to seek suppression of the evidence,
we have no doubt. Although he was temporarily out of possession of the car
at the time of the search, the bailment was to be of short duration. It would
be hyper-technical to say that he lacked a sufficient interest in his own car to
challenge the manner in which the radios he has been found guilty of stealing
were taken from it.
113. Williams v. United States, 323 F.2d 90 (10th Cir. 1963); State v. Pokini, 45
Hawaii 295, 367 P.2d 499 (1961). In Williams, supra at 94-95, the court stated:
It is well established in this circuit, and elsewhere, that the right to protection
against unreasonable search and seizure is personal, and a defendant in a
criminal case who claims no proprietary or possessory interest in the seized
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United States,114 where the court granted standing to the driver of a stolen
car, stating:
[E]ven a trespasser, if he has also taken actual possession of premises,
acquires possessory rights against all the world except the true
owner. Thus a squatter upon the property of another, who builds
a house there and lives there, has such rights, and we think that the
Supreme Court would not deny them as against the lawless officer
who breaks, enters and searches without a warrant. 115
C. Standing Based Upon Relationship to the Property Seized
Prior to the Jones decision, opinions and scholarly commentary conceded that
standing could be grounded upon a showing of a possessory or proprietary
interest in the property seized. 116 However, many subtle distinctions which the
Jones opinion did not fully obviate have arisen out of this general principle.
In cases where the automatic standing rule is deemed inapplicable and de-
fendant cannot show a sufficient interest in the premises searched, he may be
forced to rely upon his interest in the seized property to establish standing.
Unfortunately, the decisions involving this principle are hopelessly confused
because of a failure to distinguish between interest in the property seized and
interest in the premises searched. 117
Generally, the types of interest in the property seized are possession on the
person, custody and ownership. If the defendant can show by some credible
evidence that the goods in question were seized from his person, there seems
to be no question that he may claim standing to object to the seizure, without
alleging or proving anything more. 118
Custody of the goods, without the fact of ownership or possession on the
person, produced contradictory results prior to Jones.119 Jones would now
property has no standing to object to the method of seizure . . . [Citations
omitted.] This rule is particularly applicable where the property seized was
taken from a stolen automobile to which the defendants had no title or legal
right to possession.
114. 371 F.2d 385 (9th Cir. 1967).
115. Id, at 391.
116. See Weeks, supra note 92, at 66-71.
117. Id. at 65-66.
118. In Wyche v. United States, 193 F.2d 703, 705 (D.C. Cir. 1951), cert. denied,
342 U.S. 943 (1952) it was noted that "Wyche was aggrieved . . . because the search
was of his person. He therefore had standing to object to its admission without asserting
ownership of the property seized." See United States v. Fowler, 17 F.R.D. 499 (S.D.
Cal. 1955).
119. Compare In re No. 32 East Sixty-Seventh Street, 96 F.2d 153 (2d Cir. 1938),
with Lewis v. United States, 92 F.2d 952 (10th Cir. 1937). In the former case a bailee
because he had mere custody.
of merchandise was granted standing. In the latter case the bailee was denied standing
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require a finding of standing in such a case.12° Physical proximity to the item
seized does not seem to be enough to meet the rule of law requiring possessory
interest; one must also show either custody or ownership.121 However, if the
party seizing the goods is able to assert a superior property interest, an otherwise
valid possessory interest is insufficient. 122 It has been argued that a defendant
has no right to base standing on possession or ownership of items seized where
the goods are stolen. 123 The implications of Jones, however, seem to require a
contrary result under either of two arguments. First, the thief, under common
law property rules, has an interest superior to all but the true owner. Therefore,
unless the courts employ an agency theory to put the police in the shoes of
the true owner, the defendant's superior right gives him standing to object. 124
Second, since Jones and later cases do away with property law concepts when
the right to privacy is involved, it would seem unfair to import the superior
title argument into a case involving the constitutional right to be free from
police intrusion.1 25 The Supreme Court recently pointed out that the fact that
goods were illegally possessed cannot alone be a basis for denial of standing:
[W]e have given recognition to the interest in privacy despite the
complete absence of a property claim by suppressing the very items
which at common law could be seized with impunity: stolen goods,
120. The rule that a bailee's possession is not sufficient to confer standing would cer-
tainly be overruled by the Jones decision, since the distinction between "physical custody"
and "possession" would clearly fall within the "subtle distinctions" rejected by the
Jones case. See Weeks, supra note 92, at 74.
121. United States v. Konigsberg, supra note 50, where the court held that presence
was not enough to show possession for purposes of standing.
122. United States v. Masterson, 383 F.2d 610 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390
U.S. 954 (1968).
123. There is no question that stolen goods can be suppressed if automatic standing
is found or if the illegal search is of the defendant's person or of a premises upon which
he is legitimately present. If none of those bases for standing exist, however, the theory
is that there is not sufficient possession to support standing. For instance, in Simmons v.
United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968), defendant objected to the search of his suitcase
which was in a house in which he did not live, and he was not present during the search.
Inside the suitcase were stolen money wrappers which he sought to suppress on the
theory that the suitcase belonged to him. The trial court denied the defendant's motion
to suppress and the only issue before the Supreme Court was whether the defendant's
testimony in support of such motion could be used as evidence against him. See also
Unitcd States v. Lester, 21 F.R.D. 376 (W.D. Pa. 1957), aff'd, 282 F.2d 750 (3d
Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 937 (1961).
124. Cotton v. United States, 371 F.2d 385 (9th Cir. 1967). In United States v.
Masterson, supra note 122, the person seizing the property, by virtue of being a trustee
in bankruptcy, had superior title to the corporate records.
125. See United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951). There the government argued
that since heroin could not be legally possessed for any purpose, the defendant could
not object to the seizure. The Court rejected the argument, stating: "We are of the
opinion that Congress, in abrogating property rights in such goods, merely intended to
aid in their forfeiture and thereby prevent the spread of the traffic in drugs rather than to
abolish the exclusionary rule formulated by the courts in furtherance of the high purposes
of the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 53-54.
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Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98; instrumentalities, Beck v. Ohio,
379 U.S. 89; McDonald v. United States, [335 U.S. 451]; and contra-
band, Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699; Aguilar v. Texas,
378 U.S. 108.126
Ownership of the items seized, without possession, is another valid basis for
standing. Cases involving ownership arise when defendant leaves property with
another and the property is seized when defendant is not present. In the
leading case of United States v. Jeffers,127 the police, while conducting an
illegal search of a hotel room rented by the defendant's aunts, uncovered
heroin stored there by Jeffers. On a motion to suppress, Jeffers, admitting
ownership of the heroin, showed that although he paid no rent for the hotel
room, "the Misses Jeffries had given respondent a key to their room, [and] that
he had their permission to use the room at will . . -128 The aunts did not
know that he was storing narcotics there. The Court, in rejecting the govern-
ment's argument that Jeffers had no standing to object to the search, stated:
"[t]o hold that this search and seizure were lawful as to the respondent would
permit a quibbling distinction to overturn a principle which was designed to
protect a fundamental right."'129 Although Jeffers could now be decided on an
automatic standing theory or legitimate presence theory, ownership of the prop-
erty seized is also a valid basis for establishing standing. Some courts130 have
ignored the rule13' while others have required technical adherence to the facts
in Jeffers before granting standing.132 Nevertheless, standing can be based on
ownership by showing ownership and legal access to the seized goods, both
"ownership" and "legal access" being relative terms.133 Jeffers seems to make
it clear that ownership does not have to be absolute.13 4 Legal access, moreover,
126. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 305-06 (1967).
127. Supra note 125.
128. Id. at 50.
129. Id. at 52.
130. Since the charge amounted to possession of heroin, Jeffers would have had
automatic standing under Jones. Jeffers has never been expressly or impliedly over-
ruled. Although it relies to some extent on property law concepts, it also rejects subtle
distinctions urged by the government concerning lack of right of ownership and lack of
trespass towards Jeffers. See United States v. Bozza, 365 F.2d 206, 222-24 (2d Cir.
1966).
131. See, e.g., Fondren v. State, 253 Miss. 241, 175 So. 2d 628 (1965); Sanders v.
State, 351 P.2d 1079 (Okla. Crim. 1960).
132. Commonwealth v. Raymond, 412 Pa. 194, 194 A.2d 150 (1963), cert. denied,
377 U.S. 999 (1964) (no showing that defendant had right to use room at will) ; United
States ex rel. Puntari v. Maroney, 220 F. Supp. 801 (W.D. Pa. 1963) (no claim of
ownership of goods); Huffmeister v. State, 170 Tex. Crim. 460, 341 S.W.2d 928 (1960);
Combs v. Commonwealth, 341 S.W.2d 774 (Ky. 1960).
133. Compare United States v. Jeffers, supra note 125, with Schwimmer v. United
States, 232 F.2d 855 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 833 (1956). See also Villano v.
United States, 310 F.2d 680 (10th Cir. 1962).
134. Although, by statute, Jeffers could not "own" the heroin, this did not deter the
Court from suppressing it. United States v. Jeffers, supra note 125.
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could mean anything short of trespass 35 and prior to Jeffers, some courts used
a theory of "constructive possession" to come to the same conclusion.1 36
The "ownership" requirement, however, does have certain limits. 37 Where
corporate records are seized for use in prosecution of corporate officers, the
corporate entity has standing to raise a fourth amendment claim.138 However,
prior to Jones, many courts had refused to extend that right to corporate
officers or employees. 39 Since that decision, courts have been inconsistent in
deciding the question. The majority of cases deny standing to the officers as
employees, 14° but several cases indicate that the correct approach is to grant
standing to the party against whom the search is directed.' 4 ' In cases in which
corporate records do not technically belong to the defendant but are in fact
his work product and the search is made to uncover evidence against him,
standing should not be denied the defendant.1 42
D. Derivative Standing
Although appellate decisions often state that the rights guaranteed by the
fourth amendment are "personal," a line of cases stemming from McDonald v.
United States143 grant a defendant standing to object to fourth amendment
135. "One does not have to maintain his grip on his effects when he has a lawful
right to have those effects rest undisturbed in the place where he has put them. On the
other hand, a trespasser who places his property where it has no right to be has no
right of privacy . . . to that property." State v. Pokini, 45 Hawaii 295, 315, 367 P.2d
499, 509 (1961).
136. United States v. Stappenback, 61 F.2d 955 (2d Cir. 1932). Here the defendant's
coat, with a slip of incriminating paper in the pocket, was found by police in another's
apartment while the defendant was not present. The court held that "although hanging
within another's building, the suit remained in his possession." Id. at 957. See United
States v. Blok, 188 F.2d 1019 (D.C. Cir. 1951); but see Perlman v. United States, 247
U.S. 7 (1918).
137. Granza v. United States, 377 F.2d 746 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 939
(1967) draws a line insofar as it holds that the interest in the future profit derived from
the sale of the item is not sufficient.
138. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
139. Lagow v. United States, 159 F.2d 245 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 331 U.S.
858 (1947); United States v. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 155 F.2d 631 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 329 U.S. 742 (1946); United States v De Vasto, 52 F.2d 26 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 284 U.S. 678 (1931); Bilodeau v. United States, 14 F.2d 582 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 273 U.S. 737 (1926); A. Guckenheimer & Bros. v. United States, 3 F.2d 786
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 268 U.S. 688 (1925).
140. E.g., Hill v. United States, 374 F.2d 871 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
842 (1967) ; United States v. Fago 319 F.2d 791 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 906
(1963).
141. See United States v. Masterson, supra note 122; Rosencranz v. United States,
334 F.2d 738, 741 (1st Cir. 1964) (Aldrich, J. concurring); Henzel v. United States,
296 F.2d 650 (5th Cir. 1961).
142. Henzel v. United States, supra note 141; ef. Villano v. United States, supra
note 133.
143. 335 U.S. 451 (1948).
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violations against a co-defendant. Standing gained under this doctrine is often
called "derivative standing." 44
In McDonald, police entered defendant's room without a warrant, arrested
McDonald and a co-defendant, Washington, and seized "numbers" parapher-
nalia. The two were jointly tried and convicted on the gambling charges. The
Court held that the search was illegal as to McDonald, who rented the room,
and reversed Washington's conviction on the same grounds, stating:
Even though we assume, without deciding, that Washington, who was
a guest of McDonald, had no right of privacy that was broken when
the officers searched McDonald's room without a warrant, we think
that the denial of McDonald's motion was error that was prejudicial
to Washington as well. In this case . . . the unlawfully seized materials
were the basis of evidence used against the codefendant. If the prop-
erty had been returned to McDonald, it would not have been available
for use at the trial.145
Unfortunately, the Court did not elaborate upon its extension of the exclu-
sionary rule, and only three justices completely endorsed this opinion. Mr.
Justice Rutledge concurred but suggested that the rule should be broader; 146
Mr. Justice Jackson indicated that he would grant Washington standing
under the theory later adopted in Jones,147 while Mr. Justice Frankfurter
joined in the Court's opinion and in Mr. Justice Jackson's concurrence.14 8
Under Jones, Washington would be granted standing because he was "legiti-
mately on the premises." Moreover, the Jones Court, in dicta, suggested that
it might be ready to reconsider the rule in McDonald,149 but in Wong Sun v.
United States,150 the Court, without citing McDonald, refused to extend the
rule. In Wong Sun, police illegally arrested Toy who then told them that Yee
sold narcotics. The police went to Yee's home, questioned him, and obtained
an ounce of heroin he said "Sea Dog" had given him. Toy then told police
that Wong Sun was "Sea Dog" and showed the officers where Wong Sun
lived. They were admitted to the house by Wong Sun's wife, but a search
yielded no narcotics. Yee, Toy and Wong Sun were all charged with federal
narcotics violations. Toy and Wong Sun were tried together. The Court held
that the heroin obtained from Yee was the fruit of Toy's illegally obtained
statement and suppressible as to Toy. The Court refused to extend this ruling
144. See G. SHADOAN, supra note 76, at 38. Other terms are "umbrella defense" and
third party standing.
145. McDonald v. United States, supra note 143, at 456.
146. Id. at 457.
147. "[E]ven a guest may expect the shelter of the rooftree he is under against
criminal intrusion. I should reverse as to both defendants." Id. at 261.
148. Ibid.
149. See Jones v. United States, supra note 71, at 461.
150. 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
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to Wong Sun because the heroin was not obtained illegally from Yee but was
obtained as a result of the statement illegally obtained from Toy.151
Although it could be argued that Wong Sun sub silentio overruled McDonald,
most courts and commentators feel that McDonald is still viable.1 52 The
nature of the right, however, is not wholly apparent. Clearly the right is not
one which allows a defendant to object to any police illegality employed in
obtaining evidence against him. Such a rule would completely obviate the
standing requirement; the Court has not yet gone that far. As a recent
commentator pointed out, all the implications of this concept of derivative
standing are not yet clear, 15 3 but courts have limited their holdings to situa-
tions in which the illegal search invaded a co-defendant's right to privacy.'5
The rationale of this limitation has been stated as follows:
The government's confusion stems from the fact that it misconstrues
appellants' argument. Appellants do not claim McDonald to hold
that a defendant has standing to complain of a violation of some-
one else's constitutional right. To repeat, all appellants claim is that
under McDonald, where the person whose constitutional right has
been violated has properly complained thereof and his motion to
suppress has been wrongfully denied, the right not to be convicted
upon the basis of such evidence extends to the co-defendants as well
as the movant.
155
151. Id. at 491-92:
Our holding . .. that this ounce of heroin was inadmissible against Toy does
not compel a like result with respect to Wong Sun. The exclusion of the nar-
cotics as to Toy was required solely by their tainted relationship to informa-
tion unlawfully obtained from Toy, and not by any official impropriety con-
nected with their surrender by Yee. The seizure of this heroin invaded no right
of privacy of person or premises which would entitle Wong Sun to object to its
use at his trial.
152. G. SHADOAN, LAW AND TACTICS IN FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES 40 (1964) notes:
"[i]n Wong Sun, however, the derivative standing point was not raised or discussed in
either brief. The brief consideration by the Supreme Court under these circumstances
leaves the law in considerable doubt." The majority in Rosencranz v. United States,
supra note 141, at 741, distinguished Wong Sun from McDonald by stating:
In Wong Sun, this evidence in issue [narcotics] was not illegally seized from
Yee but had been voluntarily given by him to the police. If Yee had moved
to suppress this evidence prior to trial, which he did not, the motion would have
been denied. Wong Sun, therefore, could certainly have no greater rights than
Yee in the seized evidence. The evidence was inadmissible as to Toy because
it was discovered as a result of statements made by Toy while under an illegal
arrest. The Court did not feel that this taint carried over to Wong Sun and
allowed introduction of the evidence against him.
But see Bozza v. United States, supra note 130, at 223.
153. G. SHADOAN, supra note 152, at 41.
154. See Barnett v. United States, 384 F.2d 848 (5th Cir. 1967) ; Gillespie v. United
States, 368 F.2d 1 (8th Cir. 1966); Rosencranz v. United States, supra note 141;
Schoeneman v. United States, 317 F.2d 173 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Hair v. United States,
289 F.2d 894 (D.C. Cir. 1961) ; Nelson v. United States, 208 F.2d 505 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 346 U.S. 827 (1953).
155. Rosencranz v. United States, supra note 141, at 741 n.4.
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The derivative nature of the right is limited to co-defendants, but there is
some confusion as to the type of co-defendant that can avail himself of the
right. In United States v. Serrano,156 narcotics were seized from Serrano's con-
federate. The two were jointly indicted but the cases were severed prior to
trial. Serrano attempted to suppress the evidence but was denied standing. In
United States v. Lee Wan Nam,1 5 7 three defendants were tried jointly. Co-
defendant May Moy's motion to suppress was granted on the ground that the
police had illegally entered his apartment. The government did not introduce
the ill-gotten evidence during the case in chief; however, when a motion for
judgment of acquittal was granted as to May Moy, the government succeeded
in introducing the evidence in rebuttal.
In United States v. Bozza, 158 the defendant against whom the search was
directed moved to suppress the items and failed. Thereafter he pleaded guilty,
and when his co-defendants went to trial the evidence was also admitted
against them. On appeal the Second Circuit held that the appellants had no
standing to object to the search.15 9 The First Circuit, in Rosencranz v. United
States,160 took a more liberal view of the rule. In that case the police had
illegally searched one Amorello's truck. He and two others were indicted on the
basis of evidence found in the truck. Amorello moved to suppress, but the
other defendants did not. Amorello lost the motion and pleaded guilty. The
other defendants went to trial and objected to the introduction of the evidence
at trial on the basis of McDonald. On appeal they prevailed, even though, as
Judge Aldrich noted, any derivative rights they had were lost when Amorello
pleaded. 161 The court felt that limiting the right to object would be unfair,
especially when the offended party did not appeal. 162
Some courts have indicated that the crucial question is whether the seized
items would be available at trial. 163 This argument focuses on two considera-
tions. First, some courts argue that no matter what the nature of the seized
156. 317 F.2d 356 (2d Cir. 1963).
157. 274 F.2d 863 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 803 (1960).
158. Supra note 130.
159. Id. at 223:
The values that the Fourth Amendment protects are sufficiently advanced by
excluding the results of illegal searches and seizures at the behest of "victims"
in the broad sense the Supreme Court has given that term; we see no important
purpose to be served by holding that a thief who has left evidence of his crime
on the premises of a confederate is subrogated to the latter's right to com-
plain of a search and seizure, so that he may exercise this although the con-
federate has not elected to do so or to pursue an election once made.
160. Supra note 141.
161. Id. at 742.
162. "[T]he trial court's erroneous denial of that motion severely prejudiced appellants
since the seized materials formed a substantial part of the evidence used to convict
them." Id. at 740. See Binkiewicz v. Scafati, 281 F. Supp. 233 (D. Mass. 1968).
163. For a general discussion, see Note, Search and Seizure: Admissibility of Illegally
Acquired Evidence Against Third Parties, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 400, 403 (1966).
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evidence, the government could produce it at trial by subpoena duces tecum
even if a motion to suppress and return has been granted. 1 This argument
necessarily requires that the victim of the search is not a defendant in the
trial. 165 In opposition to this theory is Mr. Justice Holmes' belief that such
evidence "shall not be used at all."166 Second, it is argued that because a
successful motion to suppress does not entitle the moving party to the return
of the evidence if it is contraband per se, the derivative standing rule does not
apply to cases involving such evidence. 167 This theory is based upon the dif-
ferent results in Wong Sun and McDonald. It is submitted that the "avail-
ability" theory should never be determinative of the standing issue. As a prac-
tical matter, evidence seized illegally from A cannot be introduced against
defendant B when the two are being tried jointly.168 Admission of the evidence
would allow cross-examination as to its source, a possibility that would auto-
matically prejudice defendant A. This is true whether the government could
subpoena the goods for use against defendant B, or would have the goods
available because of their contraband nature. The main issue in every case,
then, is whether the aggrieved party is a co-defendant. Given his status as a
co-defendant, the traditional view has been to determine whether he has as-
serted his rights to suppress. 6 9 If he has moved to suppress, then other co-
defendants should have derivative standing. Since most aggrieved parties with
the right to suppress damaging evidence will exercise that right, the inquiry
then should shift to cases in which the government frustrates the normal
process by failing to indict the aggrieved party, dropping the charges against
him or severing the cases. 170 In many instances the government has been al-
lowed to avoid the full consequence of the motion to suppress by initiating
such action. Such a use of discretion or procedural devices does little to further
the discouragement of illegal police conduct, the very purpose of the exclu-
sionary rule. 171 The "amenities of justice" are not realized when courts allow
anomalous results in this class of cases.
Conclusion
The erosion of the strict standing requirements relevant to police illegality has
been evident ever since McDonald v. United States.1 72 This development is con-
164. E.g., United States v. Granello, 365 F.2d 990 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
386 U.S. 1019 (1967) ; United States v. Bozza, supra note 130.
165. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, supra note 138.
166. Id. at 392; See McDonald v. United States, supra note 143, at 456; Malinski v.
New York, 324 U.S. 401, 411 (1945). See also G. SHADOAN, supra note 152.
167. See Gillespie v. United States, supra note 154, at 6.
168. See Note, Search and Seizure: Admissibility of Illegally Acquired Evidence
Against Third Parties, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 400 (1966).
169. See, e.g., McDonald v. United States, supra note 143.
170. E.g., Serrano v. United States, supra note 156.
171. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 629-35 (1965).
172. Supra note 143.
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sistent with recent judicial concern for the proper administration of criminal
justice. Stripped to its essentials, the standing requirement is a device which
frustrates the implementation of the exclusionary rule in situations where the
police have acted illegally. It is clear that Article three of the Constitution does
not dictate but rather permits the standing requirements. 173
In certain cases, the Supreme Court has permitted the assertion of another's
constitutional rights. 174 These cases indicate that where the nature of the right
involved is of great importance, traditional standing rules should not be inter-
jected to defeat a decision on the merits, particularly where it is difficult for the
person primarily protected by the right to assert it. 175 In determining whether
a particular rule of law should be capable of assertion by third parties, the
nature of the right must be assayed. If the right is one which the public at
large has a great interest in seeing observed, it can be held that the right is not
personal and that therefore a rule requiring a personal interest for standing is
inapplicable. 176
Under this reasoning the basic question is whether a defendant, whose
personal rights have not been breached, " 'belongs to the class for whose sake
the constitutional protection is given .... , ,,l77 One must turn to the rationale
behind the exclusionary rule to determine whom it seeks to protect. The
underlying rationale of the exclusionary rules is protection of the general public
from police misconduct.178 If the rights guarded by the exclusionary rules are
173. See in general C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS 36-40 (1963); Sedler, Standing
to Assert Constitutional Jus Tertii in the Supreme Court, 71 YALE L.J. 599 (1962).
174. E.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); NAACP v. Alabama, 357
U.S. 449 (1958); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953); see Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). Cf. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
175. See Sedler, supra note 173, at 646-48 (1962). Sedler suggests a fourfold test
to determine if the right can be asserted by another. This test considers: (1) the
interest of the party attempting to assert the right; (2) the nature of the right to be
asserted; (3) the relationship between the person seeking to assert the right and the
third party; and (4) the practicability of assertion of such rights by third parties in
an independent action.
176. For example, in Barrows v. Jackson, supra note 174, at 257, the Court pointed
out:
Under the peculiar circumstances of this case, we believe the reasons which
underlie our rule denying standing to raise another's rights, which is only a
rule of practice, are outweighed by the need to protect the fundamental rights
which would be denied by permitting the damages action to be maintained.
The Court felt that since it was almost impossible for the Negroes harmed by the
restrictive covenant to litigate the issue, a white person who was a party to the contract
could assert the right. Cf. Flast v. Cohen, supra note 174.
177. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960) quoting from Hatch v.
Reardon, 204 U.S. 152, 160 (1907).
178. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12 (1968):
Ever since its inception, the rule -xcluding evidence seized in violation of the
Fourth Amendment has been recognized as a principal mode of discouraging
lawless police conduct. Thus, its major thrust is a deterrent one, and experience
has taught that it is the only effective deterrent to police misconduct in the
criminal context, and that without it the constitutional guarantee against un-
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general constitutional rights belonging to every citizen, 179 then every person
who has general standing by the fact that he has been charged with a crime
could be prejudiced by the introduction of illegally obtained evidence and
should be allowed to challenge the police misconduct. California, by adopting
this theory, has entirely abandoned the standing requirement in the fourth
amendment area.18 0
It is submitted that the California approach to the problem is correct. The
Supreme Court has already pointed out that the exclusionary rule is the only
effective means of condemning illegal police conduct.181 Moreover, to allow
only those persons directly affected either physically or financially by police
misconduct to establish standing, would permit some police wrongdoings to go
unchecked.1 82 As Justice Traynor has pointed out, the reasonableness of police
conduct is the main issue in every motion to suppress, and limiting requirements
such as standing are irrelevant to this inquiry. 8 3 The California rule is not
inconsistent with standing requirements in other areas of the law relevant
to rights possessed by the entire citizenry. 184 If deterrence is the reason for the
exclusionary rule, the standing requirement, hinders rather than furthers the
goals of the rule. 185 Since traditional standing requirements are no longer sup-
reasonable searches and seizures would be a mere "form of words." The rule
also serves another vital function-"the imperative of judicial integrity." (Cita-
tions omitted.)
See Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967); Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719(1966) ; Linkletter v. Walker, supra note 17 1.
179. Comment, Standing to Object to an Unreasonable Search and Seizure, 34 U. CHI.
L. REv. 342, 362 (1967).
180. People v. Martin, 45 Cal. 2d 755, 290 P.2d 855 (1955).
181. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
182. Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio at Large in the Fifty States, 1962 DUKE L.J. 319, 335:
[Jones] . . . indicates a continuing tendency to focus on a relation between the
defendant and the property involved. Such a focus to ferret out some violated
right of the defendant suggests, though perhaps unintentionally, that the
objective of the exclusionary rule is to make amends to the defendant. What
should be of primary concern is not the grievances of selected guilty defendants
such as land-owners or the gentry of invitees, but the greviousness of official
lawlessness.
183. Ibid.:
The defendant's standing to object does not depend on his showing that the
evidence was illegally obtained in violation of some right of his, substantial or
tenuous. He need only show that the state obtained the evidence illegally,
whether in violation of his rights or those of third parties, which is to say that
he must show that the state obtained the evidence in the course of a search
and seizure that was unreasonable.
184. See Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Public Actions, 74 HAmv. L. REv.
1265 (1961) ; Sedler, supra note 175.
185. People v. Martin, 45 Cal. 2d 755, 760, 290 P.2d 855, 857 (1955):
[I]f law enforcement officers are allowed to evade the exclusionary rule by
obtaining evidence in violation of the rights of third parties, its deterrent
effect is to that extent nullified. Moreover, such a limitation virtually invites
law enforcement officers to violate the rights of third parties and to trade the
escape of a criminal whose rights are violated for the conviction of others by the
use of the evidence illegally obtained against them.
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ported by the rationale of the exclusionary rule and because it is clear that
Article three of the Constitution permits the vicarious assertion of certain
constitutional rights once the parties are otherwise placed in an adversary
posture, there seems to be no real justification for a continuation of the re-
quirement. 186 Indeed, it has been hypothesized that Jones may lead toward
ultimate rejection of the standing requirement. 187 Mr. Justice Harlan has
also recognized that abandonment of the standing requirement is a possibility.'8
Commentators on the subject are generally not in accord; 8 9 however, the
most persuasive analysis of the law concludes, with one possible exception,190
that standing is no longer relevant to the exclusionary rule because:
The general deterrence rationale . . . implies that there are two sepa-
rate rights contained in the fourth amendment: (1) the personal right
to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures; and (2) the right
of the general citizenry that unreasonably seized evidence not be
used in courts so that the police will be deterred from invading their
privacy in the future. 191
The Court's recent willingness to strike down those evidentiary rules which
are without reason' 92 might well indicate that the standing doctrine is on its
last leg. 193
186. Indeed, abandonment of a standing requirement apparently has not hampered
law enforcement efficiency in California. See Note, Two Years with the Cahan Rule, 9
STAN. L. REv. 515, 538 (1957).
187. Note, The Exclusionary Rule and Question of Standing, 50 GEo. L.J. 585,
586 (1962).
188. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 390 n.12 (1968).
189. See Traynor, supra note 182; Sedler, supra note 173; Comment, supra note
179; Note, Standing to Object to an Unlawful Search and Seizure, 1965 WASH. U.L.Q.
488. But see Note, Standing to Object to an Unlawful Search and Seizure, 15 Wyo. L.J.
218 (1961).
190. It is theorized that since the right to object to an invasion of privacy belongs
in the first instance to the person whose privacy is actually invaded, an objection to
the invasion of privacy could be waived. See Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443 (1965).
Since this is so, it has been suggested that an in camera hearing be held to determine
whether the actual victim wishes to waive the objection. Comment, supra note 179,
at 361. It is submitted that this analysis is inconsistent with the deterrence rationale.
Moreover, it would seem that this theory resurrects the very problems sought to be done
away with by abolishing standing.
191. Comment, supra note 179, at 365.
192. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
193. The Supreme Court's recent grant of certiorari in Butenko v. United States, 384
F.2d 554 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. granted, 88 S. Ct. 2293 (1968) (No. 1007, 1967 Term;
renumbered No. 197, 1968 Term); Ivanov v. United States, 384 F.2d 554 (3d Cir.
1967), cert. granted, 88 S. Ct. 2273 (1968) (No. 885, 1967 Term; renumbered No. 11,
1968 Term) ; and Kolod v. United States, 371 F.2d 983 (10th Cir. 1967), cert. granted,
390 U.S. 136 (1968) (No. 133, 1967 Term; sub nom. Alderman v. United States, 1968
Term) may enable it to redefine the standing requirement in cases involving illegal
electronic surveillance. Questions presented include whether a defendant or co-defendant
has standing to suppress even if he was not present on the premises or a party to the
overheard conversation. Oral arguments on the three cases were heard on October 14,
1968.
1968)
